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1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The emergence and development of global markets during the last decade of the 
twentieth century entailed great changes with respect to economic structures.  
Companies which faced a manageable amount of competitors for years, suddenly 
stood face to face with global competition. As a result, even big players went to rack 
and ruin, because it emerged that for instance operative divisions within the 
companies were inefficient, ponderous or antiquated and thus could not respond to 
the changes in the environment within a reasonable amount of time.   
Researchers endeavored to decipher the company as a black box. Soon a 
considerable amount of papers and essays had been written, which today permit us 
to gain a deeper insight into the world of economic processes.  
Within this thesis, I would like to dare such an insight. The topic shall thereby be 
embedded in the field of mergers and acquisitions.  
Various authors hold the belief that it is better for public wealth to sell the inefficient 
company, which has been mentioned introductorily, than to liquidate it, the reason 
being that bound resources lose a considerable amount of value when destructed 
(Jensen, 1988, p 24). This is the theory for corporate control. Apart from this 
discussion, the field of mergers and acquisition holds various topics which are not 
solely important in theory, but are also a part of everyday life, and thus of 
considerable significance in practice.  
I am very interested in the procedures, which take place in the world of mergers and 
acquisitions. In this complex world, one can find every peculiarity of a simple buying 
process: people bid, endeavor to convince stockholders to sell their shares, bids are 
fended off, accepted, re-negotiated, people are pulled and pushed, in order to obtain 
a satisfying result for one or both parties. Based on the unpredictability and the 
abundance of possibilities, various measures arise which are either crowned by 
success or failure.  
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In the following thesis I would like to shed more light on the acquisition of Böhler 
Uddeholm by the Austrian voestalpine AG. Was it crowned by success or failure? 
Which strategy was pursued by the acquirer and could its shareholders benefit 
accordingly? The knowledge gained from the investigations shall finally be compared 
with theoretical findings. Are the results consistent or can gaps be identified? 
 
Before understanding the difficulties arising with the combination of two firms, the 
reader should understand the problems a single company might face. Therefore, the 
following section will take a closer look on the theory of the corporation. 
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2  THE CORPORATION  
 
2.1   The theory of the corporation 
Before I take a closer look on the motives for two companies to merge or acquire 
other companies, the reader has to understand how in theory the single enterprise is 
operated. Thereby associated difficulties and possible solutions shall be portrayed. 
Firstly, one has to imagine a corporation, which is wholly-owned (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p 10) by an entrepreneur. In this case, we can observe that the 
owner decides on how the firm is managed, meaning which goods are bought, how 
excess cash is spent, and how certain investments should be financed.  
Apart from the benefits the owner-manager derives from these pecuniary returns, 
there are also non-pecuniary benefits such as personal relations with employees, 
respect and more which add utility to the owner’s preference function (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p 11). 
 The optimal mixture is “when the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar of 
expenditure (…) is equal for each non-pecuniary item and equal to the marginal utility 
derived from an additional dollar of after-tax purchasing power” (Jensen, Meckling. 
1976). 
This scenario can however become more complex, as soon as we implement the 
possibility that parts of the company are sold. In practice, the corporation would 
commonly go public and sell shares on a stock exchange market.  
Now, various shareholders – meaning persons who legally possess an ownership 
stake (Legal dictionary, 2010) – participate in the business of the corporation. The 
firm is consequently not owned by one single entrepreneur, but by a number of 
shareholders. These can be described, depending on the number of shares they 
have acquired, either as large – or minority shareholders. 
Doubtlessly each and every shareholder will expect to receive a certain payoff, for 
the fact that he/she has placed a fair amount of money at the disposal of the 
12 
 
company. Furthermore, in case of bankruptcy, the shareholders face the possibility of 
losing all of their capital contribution. This risk, which is a limited liability, also has to 
be considered and thus the shareholder will expect to be rewarded accordingly.   
Nonetheless, the company is only likely to go bankrupt, if it is not managed 
appropriately. As we can imagine, this management process can make a vital 
contribution to the success of the corporation. But apparently, not every shareholder 
will be able or willing to manage the businesses of the company. This is the reason 
why certain choices need to be delegated from “many to few” (Grossman and Hart, 
1980, p 42).  
Delegation can however generate costs, which have to be considered, when 
discussing the efficiency of the corporation. This phenomenon is often referred to as 
the agency problem and thereby arising costs are called agency costs.  
 
2.2   The principal-agent model 
The model was first introduced by Jensen and Meckling in the year 1976. It is to 
some extent a broader view (Eisenhardt, 1989) of a paper written by Wilson in 1968, 
which came to the conclusion that individuals, pursuing the same goal and thereby 
forming a syndicate, possess different attitudes towards risk (p 119). The author 
found that the decisions can only be consistent if the parties hold the same 
cautiousness or if they agree on the same probability that an event will occur (p 131). 
In practice, this will however be seldom the case. 
The theory by Jensen and Meckling is based on the assumption that “one or more 
persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service 
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p 5).  
Since both parties want to increase their utilities, the process of delegation will lead to 
divergences. Generally these can be limited by the principal, either paying fees for 
monitoring, or setting the right incentives (e.g. contracts) by incurring bonding costs.  
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Nevertheless, at zero cost, an optimal decision from the principal’s viewpoint will not 
be reached.  
The idea of agency costs was born, which are the sum of bonding-, monitoring costs 
and residual loss, which stems from diverging interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
p 5). 
 
2.3   More on agency costs 
Furthermore the authors found that with an increasing fraction the manager sells to 
outside shareholders, the incentives of increasing his/her own utility through 
perquisites will rise.  
This behavior occurs at the expense of outside shareholders, who will soon anticipate 
it and therefore spend more resources on monitoring. The greater the fraction the 
owner tries to sell, the higher the expected costs.  
The question remains however, why apart from diverging risk preferences, interests 
between principals and agents differ as much as they do. What drives managers as 
agents and how is their utility influenced?  
 
2.3.1  Empire-building 
On the one hand, the agent is commonly held to engage in what is known as empire- 
building. Here, resources are wasted in the sense that they are used to increase the 
agent’s control of resources rather than the efficient management of the same (Chen, 
Lu and Sougiannis, 2008, p 2).  
Thereby the level of assets and employees is on the rise (Answers.com, 2010), and 
financial slack in the form of “cash and cash equivalents” such as “cash, credit and 
other corporate purchasing power by which management commands goods and 
services” (Donaldson, 1984, p 22) is generated.  
Thus managers might pursue a size-maximizing strategy rather than a value-
maximizing one (Walker, p 53, 2000). 
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Jensen (1988) got to the heart of the dilemma: “The problem is how to motivate 
managers to disgorge the cash rather than invest it at below the cost of capital or 
waste it through organizational inefficiencies” (p 29). 
 
2.3.2  Incomplete contracts 
On the other hand, agents might have different incentives, based on how they are 
rewarded. Compensation contracts as incentive mechanisms play a vital role, 
however in practice contracts are often “not powerful enough to curb the managerial 
discretion problems in large corporations” (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2008, p 5).  
This principle is also known as the theory of incomplete contracts, which is largely 
based on the assumption of asymmetric information. It concludes that it is impossible 
to write a contract for every state of the world (Hart and Moore, 1988).  
How can corporations be steered efficiently in spite of the existence of incomplete 
contracts and how can managers be kept from engaging in empire-building activities? 
Research has not stood still. This is the reason why various papers have been 
written, discussing how the problems associated with the principal-agent theorem 
might be solved.  
In these subsequent sections, the role of takeovers and mergers will partly become 
apparent.  
 
2.4  Monitoring 
If contracts are not powerful enough to induce managers ex ante, then adequate 
monitoring must ensure that agents act in the interest of the shareholders. As already 
mentioned, it is an agency cost, since monitoring has to be paid. 
Various instruments can be identified. 
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2.4.1   Boards 
One way to incorporate proper monitoring is by implementing a board of directors. 
Besides setting the proper compensation for the chief executive officer, the board has 
to approve financial statements, decide on dividend payments or share repurchases 
and recommend or oppose mergers and acquisitions (Kennon, 2010). Directors’ 
primary incentive is to protect the assets of shareholders.  
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2008, p 5) have found that performance of the board is 
positively related to the proportion of outside directors and negatively related to its 
size. Nevertheless, in practice it is not yet fully comprehensible how the different 
aspects interrelate and whether an association between composition and 
performance can be made (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
Another remark shall be that boards with rotating systems might be less likely to be 
taken over in the case of a hostile takeover. This is due to the fact that solely a 
fraction of directors are elected and therefore replaceable each year (Kennon, 2010). 
 
2.4.2   The bank-company relationship 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2008) offer a good overview of how the relationship between 
banks and companies affects performance (p 7). Based on the findings of Degryse, 
Ongena and Tümer-Alkan (2008), they hold that banks  - particularly in Continental 
Europe, where they own “large equity stakes (…) and join the boards (…)” (p 7) - can 
improve the corporate governance of firms (p 7).   
Additionally, “close bank-firm relationships create shareholder value, increase credit 
availability and discipline firm managers by preventing them from overinvesting (…), 
banks as large shareholders generally improve the performance of firms (…) and 
bank board membership improves firm performance, increases executive turnover, 
but having lenders on board decreases firm debt ratios” (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2008, 
p 7). 
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2.4.3  The role of shareholders 
Apart from boards and banks, also shareholders can have a significant influence on 
the monitoring of managers. This section shall analyze which type of shareholder is 
involved and under which circumstances monitoring can be successful. 
 
2.4.3.1  The free rider problem and monitoring 
In this context, the so called free-rider problem is of significant importance 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980. Also: Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) and shall therefore be 
discussed briefly.  
The principle states that persons attempt to be free riders in the production process 
of “the Public Good” (Grossman and Hart, 1980, p 42).  
In case, choices are delegated and the private benefit to any individual is below the 
social benefit of monitoring the behavior of the agent, “no one has a large enough 
incentive to devote resources to ensuring that the representatives are acting in the 
interest of the represented” (Grossman and Hart, 1980, p 42).  
This implies that especially minority shareholders might not set appropriate measures 
to monitor management, because the marginal increase in their personal utility is too 
small. They tend to free ride, thereby reducing optimal efficiency. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) consequently analyzed how large shareholders can “bring 
about value increasing changes in corporate policy” (p 462). They found that the 
average holding of large shareholders equaled to 15.4% (p 462). The conclusion of 
their work was that large shareholders “raise expected profits and the more so the 
greater their percentage of ownership” (p 465).  
Nonetheless, later research by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2008) has found that despite a 
certain incentive effect, “at some level concentrated ownership can induce an 
entrenchment effect and hence the quest of large shareholders for the private 
benefits of control can be detrimental to minority shareholders or creditors”(p 6).  
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Furthermore they concluded that especially pyramidal ownership structures in Europe 
lead to entrenchment being more likely, than with structures uniting cash flow - and 
control rights.  
 
2.4.3.2  The free rider problem in a corporate context 
As a consequence, this theory has also an impact on the specific takeover process. 
Before the identification of the free-rider problem, it was commonly alleged that 
hostile takeovers can easily discipline managers.  
Manne (1965, p 113) suggested for instance that a corporation, which was not 
managed on a value-maximizing strategy and thus had a lower share price, could 
easily be taken over by a raider, managed more efficiently and be sold back at a 
premium.  
Only when the free rider problem was identified, it could be proven that in practice the 
process is not as undemanding: 
Once the raider approaches the company, shareholders are inclined to believe that 
an appreciation of value will be possible in the future. By doing so, as well as by 
believing that selling their small share will not make a change, they do not tender the 
offer and free ride. Despite the raid, possibly increasing the profitability of the 
company, the merger cannot be executed (Grossman and Hart, 1980, p 43).   
One way to overcome this problem, is by excluding minority shareholders from post-
merger benefits, as further suggested by Grossman and Hart (1980, p 43). This 
process is called dilution and can be implemented in various ways. The constitution 
of the target company may comprise a regulation, which allows the raider to transfer 
post merger wealth to himself (p 46). By doing so, minority shareholders cannot 
capture the full post merger gains and are therefore inclined to tender the shares ex 
ante.  
Due to the negative effects of dilution on minority shareholders’ rights, it has however 
been largely restrained by courts (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1982. p 699), thus 
limiting its effect.  
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Another method is called freeze-out (also: squeeze out) and is described by Burkart, 
Gromb and Panunzi (1998). It can be employed, if the mode of payment is shares. In 
this case, the remaining shareholders are forced to sell on the terms of a certain 
offer, thus they can already accept the original offer (p 195). 
This can only be done, after the bidder company has acquired more than a threshold 
and possesses a compulsory acquisition limit (CAL, p 185). The CAL for most 
European countries lies at around 90% (Bergström et al 1994, in Burkart, Gromb and 
Panunzi, 1998). The idea is partly based on the findings of Yarrow (1985), who found 
that with the use of CAL, the free rider problem can be overcome.  
 
2.5  Debt in the context of the free cash flow theory 
Apart from costly monitoring, the use of debt can be a way to discipline managers, 
preventing them to engage in empire-building.  
According to Jensen (1988), the firm must pay out cash in excess of required funds if 
it wants to operate efficiently (p 28). Nonetheless, empire-building managers do not 
like to reduce resources voluntarily, because in case of financing new projects, they 
have to raise funds on capital markets instead of using internal resources that are not 
subject to being monitored (e.g. by banks).   
Further Jensen argues that debt can act in a way to discipline managers (p 29, 
1988). Debt payments reduce the amount of free cash flow, thereby reducing agency 
costs (p 29, 1988). Moreover debt issuance is somewhat a promise to pay out future 
cash flows. The sole threat of bankruptcy (p 29) might suffice to induce a more 
efficient management of corporations. 
Also debt is a “tax deductable expense” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p 35) and can 
be used as a tax shield to defer expenditures into future periods.  
Especially industry branches with high free cash flows and low growth opportunities 
are under substantial pressure, since they might waste resources for financing 
uneconomic projects (Jensen, 1988, p 31). In these cases, the control function of 
debt can be important (1988, p 31).  
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Furthermore Bradley and Jarrell (1985) found that acquirers perform exceptionally 
well before an acquisition. Jensen (1988) concluded from this fact that increased 
stock price performance leads to higher free cash flow, which is subsequently used to 
acquire targets (p 36). These have either the nature of being a bad performing 
company with poor management, or a firm which has performed well and has 
consequently generated free cash flow, which it is not willing to pay out (p 36). 
It must not be overlooked that apart from the advantages, there are also numerous 
drawbacks associated with the issuance of debt.  
Myers (1976) defined the debt overhang problem, which basically addresses the 
possible difficulty that excessive debt can lead to the forgoing of positive NPV 
projects. The nature of the dilemma lies in bondholders receiving less from an 
additional positive NPV project than else they would receive from interest payments. 
The optimal level of debt shall be “the point where marginal costs just offset marginal 
benefits” (Jensen p 30, 1988. See also: Jensen and Meckling, 1976), since otherwise 
the usual agency costs of debt as well as direct and indirect bankruptcy costs are 
likely to increase.  
The theory is also known as the static trade-off model, together with the assumption 
that companies set specific targets and balance equity and debt accordingly. 
 
2.6   The Pecking-Order Theory 
Another theory which is often referred to when discussing the advantages and 
drawbacks of debt, is the Pecking-Order model, which was first discussed by Myers 
(1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984). It was written to shed more light on how 
companies tend to finance future investments.  
The theory is not directly related to monitoring as a way to mitigate agency costs, but 
more on how capital structure affects the value of the corporation. Due to the fact that 
this aspect will also be analyzed in the context of the underlying takeover, I would like 
to briefly introduce this theory at this point. 
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Myers and Majluf suggested that managers of a firm hold inside information and 
thereby possess knowledge that outside investors do not have. Both parties know of 
the existence of this asymmetric information.  
In case the company requires capital, because it does not hold the required funds 
internally, this issuance of stock can convey vital information to the market and its 
participants (p. 4).  
Since management would only issue stock if conditions are favorable, one might 
assume that at the moment of issuance, the company is overvalued. As a 
consequence, after the announcement of issuing stock, ceteris paribus, stock prices 
will drop (p 47).  
If investment are however financed with “safe (default-risk free) debt (…), stock price 
will not fall” (p 47). 
The paper concludes that sometimes positive NPV projects might not be undertaken, 
if companies are forced to finance their project with equity. It further states that 
projects should be financed according to the Pecking-Order model. The preference 
shall thereby be the following:  
First, finance internally with financial slack. In this case, the company does not need 
to get in touch with capital markets and hence no signals are communicated.  
If financial slack is not available, and the company needs to raise funds externally, it 
should do so by first financing with safe and consequently with risky debt (see also 
Swinnen, Voordeckers and Vandemaele, 2005). Equity shall only be raised by 
retention. This is due to “external financing using debt” being “better than financing 
by equity” (p 46).  
As it becomes apparent, the Pecking Order model and the free cash flow theory 
come to similar conclusions. Both theories, despite having been developed 
separately, are in favor of the use of debt to limit free cash flows. 
While the static trade-off theory suggests that debt should be issued according to 
setting a target simultaneously trading off its costs against its benefits, the Pecking 
Order Theory holds that equity should only be used as a last resort.  
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Both models have not entirely been able to forecast how companies make their 
financing decisions in the real world.  
Recent research has turned increasingly towards dynamic models, such as the 
Market Timing Theory by Baker and Wurgler (2000). It proposes that capital structure 
is very much a result of past financing decisions of correctly timing when to issue or 
repurchase shares, thereby making use of temporary mispricing (p 35).  
Their findings are consistent with a survey conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001), 
where CEOs agreed that whether their stock was over- or undervalued “was an 
important or very important consideration in issuing equity” (in Baker and Wurgler, 
2000, p 36)  
 
2.7   Concluding remarks to Chapter 2 
To sum up, agency costs which arise with the necessity for delegation, negatively 
affect the efficiency of a corporation. Empire-building managers and goal divergences 
are among the biggest concerns.  
Debt can partially mitigate the problems associated with free cash flow, by reducing 
resources accessible by managers. The drawbacks need to be considered, however.  
Capital structure decisions of the corporation can convey information to the market. 
The issuance of debt can confirm that principals want to keep their agent from 
engaging in size-maximizing activities. Moreover it can be a sign of the ability to pay 
future obligations. 
Monitoring can be executed with the help of boards or banks. Shareholders can also 
provide an incentive. Minority shareholders are prone to free ride, whereas high 
ownership concentration might again lead to increasing entrenchment.   
Last but not least the vulnerability of corporations to takeovers can provide an 
incentive which is strong enough to discipline their agents accordingly. Free riders 
are one reason why a takeover might not be profitable for a raider, resulting in 
inefficient management despite being monitored and in an even further engagement 
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in size-maximizing empire-building. The merger and takeover activity vastly depends 
on the efficiency of the market for corporate control.  
After having highlighted the different issues which can make a contribution to the 
success of a single company, I would like to dive into the theory of mergers and 
acquisitions and analyze the factors why companies decide to merge or take over 
another company.  
The following section will closely look on a particular period of merger waves, in order 
to evaluate, why mergers and takeovers take place. The question whether such 
processes create value and for whom remains unrequited and shall be answered in 
the later part of the next section.     
 
 
3  MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
 
3.1   The need for restructuring 
Various definitions have already been stated; therefore it is time to outline the most 
important terms, since they will be used more extensively in the consecutive sections.  
The most central goal of a company is usually to grow, since “growth is vital to the 
well-being of a business” (Weston, in Rock 1987, p 31). Only then, companies are 
able to create value and as a consequence finance projects and technologies, 
guarding and building up the market position.  
Sometimes it may be necessary, to sell certain assets due to declining demand, while 
in other times the company might face the need to expand production in order to 
satisfy increasing demand. Whichever is the case, the company has to redeploy 
assets. If it does not, it faces death in the long run owing to over and underproduction 
respectively. This is the reason, why restructurings of businesses are common.   
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3.1.1   Sell-offs 
According to Weston (in Rock 1987) there is a choice of instruments of how a 
corporation can decrease or get rid of certain assets, which are not needed any 
longer. On the one hand, parts of the assets can be sold to another company. This 
process is called divestiture (p 32). On the other hand, the company can decide to 
e.g. spin-off a division, creating a subsidiary, which is still pro rata controlled by the 
shareholders of the mother company, but shares are subsequently traded separately 
(p 33). There are even more options of sell-offs, which will however not be discussed 
in more detail. 
 
3.1.2   Expansion 
Expansion is the playground for mergers and acquisitions. Companies are fused 
together, other are acquired by their rivals or competitors. Another form, also 
commonly known is the joint venture, which is also considered as an expansion 
(Weston, in Rock 1987, p 32), because companies engage in a “temporary 
partnership arrangement” (lbid) with a limited lifespan.  
The main distinction, which has to be made, is how mergers actually differ from 
acquisitions.  
 
3.1.2.1 Merger or acquisition? 
A clear line between the terms merger and acquisition is hard to draw. The English 
dictionary does not only understand fusion, union and combination, but also 
integration, when talking about mergers (Linguee.com, 2010). From this perspective, 
these definitions can be confusing, because similar or even identical expressions are 
attributable to acquisitions: acquirement, takeover, purchase (lbid).  
From now on, the term merger shall be used when talking about fusions, whereas 
acquisition is to be seen more as a process, in which the target is overtaken and 
consequently integrated. The term mergers and acquisitions (M&A) shall encompass 
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the activity of fusions and purchases, hence the overall market activity in the field of 
expansion. 
 
3.1.2.2 Horizontal or vertical? 
Research by Buehler and Schmutzler (2003) shows that despite treating horizontal 
and vertical issues simultaneously, they do have different characteristics (p 2). The 
European Commission even stated that vertical integration is a requirement for 
“significant increases of market shares” and “that only firms of sufficient size were 
(are) able to integrate vertically” (lbid).  
Furthermore the authors found that “efficient firms with a large market share are more 
likely to integrate vertically than inefficient firms, and integrated firms tend to invest 
more into cost reduction than separated firms” (p 27).  
As a matter of fact, the underlying acquisition of Böhler Uddeholm can be considered 
as a vertical acquisition. Whether voestalpine can consequently be regarded as an 
efficient company which significantly increased its market share, shall be analyzed in 
Chapter 5 and the subsequent sections. 
 
3.1.3  Corporate control 
Restructuring can also occur in the way that steps are taken to “retain, strengthen, or 
change corporate control” (Weston, in Rock 1987, p 33). Prominent ways of 
strengthening control would be antitakeover measures, which shall be discussed in 
Chapter 4. A means to change corporate control, however, is the use of golden 
parachutes which will be briefly stated under 3.4.   
 
3.1.4  Rearranged ownership structure 
Moreover a company can be restructured in a way that it is delisted from public stock 
trading. This process is called going-private (Weston, in Rock 1987, p 34). 
Frequently, acquiring parties are members of management, who then gain a certain 
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amount of equity (managerial buy out) (lbid, p 34). If the deal is largely financed with 
debt, the transaction is referred to as leveraged buy-out (LBO) (lbid, p 34). Other 
forms of rearranging ownership structure can be in the form of management buy-ins, 
where a company is overtaken by external management (Wirtschaftslexikon24.net, 
2010). 
 
3.2  Waves and their drivers 
A great deal of how we understand merger and takeover activity today is based on 
the research of past merger waves. These investigations partly help to make us 
understand why mergers occur in the first place and endeavor to explain under which 
circumstances value for shareholders can be created.  
Statistical data of early merger waves is mainly provided by the U.S - merger control, 
which was introduced by the end of the 19th century. European merger control for 
instance, was launched much later in the 1980s (Kleinert and Klodt, 2002, p 3). 
International data is not really available (Black, 2000). Hence, much of early research 
is based on developments in the United States.  
Illustration 1 demonstrates that M&A activity dates back to the early 20th century.  
 
Illustration 1. Kleinert, Klodt, 2002 (p 4) 
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3.2.1  The first and second wave 
The first wave (1897-1904) was characterized by horizontal mergers, which were 
motivated by the wish to increase efficiency. This was done with the help of lower 
production costs by increasing output: a phenomenon also referred to as economies 
of scale. This resulted in large industrial trusts. Nonetheless, the political world did 
not appreciate the happenings and thus introduced the Sherman and Clayton Act, 
thereby limiting further horizontal merger activity (Kleinert and Klodt, 2000) 
Due to the limitations, companies explored efficiency gains from vertical and 
conglomerate mergers (1920-1929). Again, economies of scale could be realized as 
a result of networks, particularly in the railroad and utilities sector. So called clusters 
started to emerge as a consequence (Kleinert and Klodt, 2000). The end of the wave 
was put to a halt by the Great Depression and the collapse of the stock market in 
October 1929 (Gaughan, 1994).  
 
3.2.2  The third wave (1965-1975) 
Research is mainly based on findings by American authors, such as Shleifer and 
Vishny, who report findings of Fortune 500 companies. The main characteristics of 
this wave were friendly acquisitions in the form of stock and even more importantly, 
unrelated diversifications. Rumelt (1974) found that this type of merger experienced 
an increase from 7.3% in 1959 to 18.7% in 1969.  
One reason why takeover activity was at such a high level, was the reluctance to pay 
out free cash flows, which were accumulated owing to high valuations of stock 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1991, p 52). Acquisitions were therefore a way to get rid of 
these reserves, without facing the need to pay out cash in the form of dividends, 
which were “regarded as a complete waste” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991, p 52). 
A perfect example for this behavior (see free cash flow theory, section 4.5) is the oil 
industry, which was subject to fundamental restructurings, beginning in 1973 
(Jensen, 1988, p 32). Managers did not find valuable investments within the industry, 
thus turned to other industry branches. Mobil purchased the retailer Marcor, Exxon 
bought the office equipment company Vydec (Jensen, 1988, p 34).  
27 
 
At first, it was commonly held that unrelated diversifications can be a source of value, 
because small companies, which are subject to takeover were said to possess 
inefficient management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991, p 52).  
Not surprisingly, shareholders also appreciated unrelated acquisitions and valued the 
announcements accordingly. Research by Matsusaka (1990) shows that on average 
the stock price of the bidding company rose by $8 million, whereas a related 
acquisitions resulted in a decline in stock price by $4 million.  
The most important reason was however the aggressive antitrust regulation, which 
had been put in place, in order to scotch mergers within the same industry.  
As a consequence, the regulations of the government had created acquisitions, 
which were “among the least successful of the last decade” (Jensen, 1988, p 34).  
According to Kaplan and Weisbach (1990), 44% off all acquisitions between 1971 
and 1982 were divested by 1989 (in Shleifer and Vishny, 1991, p 52) and are hence 
a confirmation for the unsuccessful third merger wave.  
By the end of 1973, Germany implemented its own merger control while the U.S 
additionally tightened its system (Kleinert and Klodt, 2000), moving away from 
liberalizing the market for corporate control.  
The interpretation of this matter is critical. Some argue that this form of diversification 
was a good idea back in the 1960s (Williamson, 1975), whereas other claim that it 
was a mistake right from the start (Chandler, 1990) which was undone during the 
fourth wave.  
The Chandlerian view would however imply that the market and its participants made 
wrong expectations as far as success of unrelated diversification was concerned 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). 
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3.2.3  The fourth wave (1984-1988) 
The fourth wave was an occurrence attributable to Europe rather than to the United 
States, mainly because national companies prepared for the European Union as a 
single market (Kleinert and Klodt, 2000, p 4).  
But, the wave also hit the States, as research by Shleifer and Vishny reports. A large 
proportion of transactions were hostile. Contrarily to the third wave, the form of 
payment turned away from stock towards cash (p 53).  
Apart from leveraged buyouts, new acquisition modes encompassed also so called 
bust-up takeovers, which pursued the idea to sell certain divisions that were 
overtaken to other companies. “A substantial fraction of the assets” were target of 
these divestiture processes (Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).  
The number of unrelated acquisitions was on the decline. In contrast to the third 
wave, shareholders now did not appreciate such transactions. When companies 
engaged in related diversification however, stock prices rose accordingly (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny in Shleifer and Vishny 1991). In this new type of expansion, 
acquirer and target are not related, but due to e.g. selling similar products, synergies 
can be created (Walker, 2000, p 56). 
Moreover industries which were mainly targeted by mergers had previously been 
deregulated. Examples would be the airlines and transportation sector, but also 
financial services, broadcasting and oil and gas. Thereby transportation and 
broadcasting accounted for 20% and oil and gas for 26.3% of the total M&A activity 
from 1981 until 1984 (Jarell, Brickley and Netter in Gaughan, 1994, p 297).  
One indication of the research in the field of the third and fourth merger wave is that a 
constant development towards greater efficiency does not necessarily take place 
without detours.  
Another finding is that stock prices do not certainly reflect true value, because 
“investors can and do make mistakes” (p 59).  
Last but not least “aggressive government policy (…) can have large unintended 
effects” (p 59).  
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3.2.4  The fifth wave (1995- 
The last wave has an international character with various cross-border transactions 
(Black, 2000). Examples would be Daimler Chrysler as well as the $180 billion 
Vodafone-Mannesmann deal.  
Illustrations 2 and 3 below demonstrate that merger activity in Europe is on the rise 
during the period 1988-1992 and from 1998 onwards. The illustrations suggest that in 
1999 more than 45% of total merger value involves at least one European party. At 
the same time the value of U.S. acquisitions decreased.  
Also Asian markets join the activities, having grown “70-fold in dollar value (…) from 
$4 billion to $281 billion” over the period 1985 to 1999 (Black, 2000, p 5). The 
expansion of Chinese manufacturers in the steel market, which will be described in 
chapter 4, is only a hint of how strong growth continues to accelerate the M&A 
market from then onwards.  
Liberalization and deregulation are probably the best words, which describe the fifth 
wave. The most active industries shifted from the 1970s with metal mining and real 
estate to the oil and gas and textile industry in the 1980s. Finally in the 1990s, again 
metal mining and ranked second media and telecommunications were among the 
most dynamic environments (Kleinert and Klodt, 2000, p 6).  
The following section shall outline which theories exist, in order to explain this 
phenomenon of clusters within various industries and the waves themselves. 
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Illustration 2. Black, 2000 (p 5) 
 
 
Illustration 3. Black, 2000 (p 4) 
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3.3  Why waves? 
The reasons for waves are often tried to be explained with two rather contrary 
theories.  
 
3.3.1  The neoclassical approach 
Supporters of the neoclassical hypothesis suggest that these reorganizations within 
these industries stem from shocks which affect the economic, technological, or 
regulatory environment. (Harford, 2004, p 530). Coase (1937), Gort (1969), or 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001,2002) are among the most recognized followers of 
the theory (in Harford, 2004).  
Generally it can be said that three main assumptions are made. (1) Managers 
maximize shareholder wealth, (2) mergers create wealth and last but not least, (3) 
capital markets are efficient (Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2006, p 2). This stands in 
contrast to behavioral approaches, which does not assume (1) and (3).  
 
3.3.2  The behavioral hypothesis 
Work by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) has recently moved into the foreground, 
proposing that mergers are mainly motivated by how stock is valued. In case 
managers see their stock is overvalued, they “use the stock to buy real assets of 
undervalued targets through mergers” (Harford, 2004, p 533).  
Their approach is not new. Already in 1988 Golbe and White found a “positive 
correlation between stock valuations and merger activity” (Harford, 2000, p 533).  
 
3.3.3   Contrary conclusions 
Recent literature provided by Harford (2004) and Gugler, Yurtoglu and Mueller (2006) 
come to rather dissimilar conclusions.  
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Harford, for instance holds that by and large mergers are a result of industry shocks, 
thereby supporting the neoclassical hypothesis. This phenomenon alone does not 
however create a merger wave, so Harford. Solely in combination with adequate 
liquidity within the markets, the necessary transactions are likely to be made. The 
author further clarifies that clustering as can be found in merger waves, is not caused 
by the shock itself, but by the increased macro-level liquidity (p 559). 
Gugler, Yurtoglu and Mueller apparently belong to a different school of thought. Their 
reasoning is in so far diverse that they argue from a valuation perspective. The initial 
idea is that markets are increasingly optimistic, owing to increasing share prices. 
Hence, announcements for value destroying mergers are not valued accordingly: 
they should lead to drops in share price, but do not. As soon as the actual outcomes 
are realized, stock prices drop and the optimism vanishes (p 39-40).  
Apart from the need for liquidity, which both theories seem to embrace, there are 
numerous factors, which can either encourage or hamper the appearance of mergers 
and takeovers.  
The subsequent analysis will however refrain from the context of waves, and 
concentrate on the climate and motives for specific takeovers.  
 
3.4  The proper climate 
In his paper, Black (2000) discusses various factors, which can lead to higher M&A 
activity in the United States as well as in Europe. I would like to put the focus on the 
findings related to Europe, as they will be relevant in subsequent sections.  
Weak unions, as can be found in the newly established technology and 
communications sector, can be considered to be fertile ground for takeovers. In 
Europe, labor unions are comparatively strong, but becoming weaker (p 11).  
The hostility of target governments with the aim of preventing foreign takeovers of 
domestic companies is also a characteristic of the European market. France and 
Spain are very good examples for this type of behavior (p 11), but also Austria. This 
will become particularly apparent in the takeover, which is subject of this paper (see 
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5.3.2 Ownership structure and corporate governance). However, the political 
opposition against hostile takeovers seems to be declining. Evidence can be found 
when looking at the takeover-friendly regulations (the Thirteenth Company Law 
Directive), the European Union is implementing (p 12). 
The introduction of golden parachutes and stock options is supposed to decrease 
resistance of target top management, rewarding it accordingly for the loss of their 
occupation. It has the aim to facilitate changes in corporate control. Trends to 
implement such techniques can be observed in Europe, despite being pushed much 
stronger in the United States. 
The recognition that governments are often unsuccessful in managing businesses 
has furthermore lead to a worldwide trend of privatization and deregulation (p 13). 
Again, evidence which is provided in the next section, will show that the two 
companies voestalpine and Böhler Uddeholm were wrested from the grip of the state, 
before the acquisition occurred (see 3.2, 3.3) 
The capitalist tendency towards “the market knows best”, leads to less interferences 
in large takeovers (p 13).  
 
3.5  Motives 
Besides the climatic reasons already mentioned, which are of a more macro-
economic or at least industry-wide nature, I would like to shed more light on the 
motives for particular companies to merge with or take over another company.  
There are various theories of asset redeployment in the course of reorganization, 
each offering a slightly different form of why M&A might be preferable. The most 
important ones are the following: 
 
3.5.1  The efficiency theory 
This theory states that by combining two companies, management can be improved 
or the overall efficiency of the company can be amplified by making use of synergy 
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gains (Weston, in Rock 1987, p 35). This theory found a great number of supporters 
during the 1960s merger wave, with the commonly held “2+2=7” effect. Synergies fall 
into one of the three consecutive categories: 
 
3.5.1.1 Operating synergies  
Examples for operating synergies can especially be found in the period of the first 
merger wave, which was the age of horizontal integration. In this particular period the 
managers’ objective was largely economies of scale.  
In vertical integration, it is held that increases in efficiency stem from a reduction of 
overall costs, emerging for instance in communication and bargaining processes. By 
combining companies at different phases of production, coordination may also 
become more efficient (Weston, in Rock 1987, p 35). 
 
3.5.1.2 Financial synergies 
A merger can lead to a different composition of cash flows, reducing the risk of 
bankruptcy. Debt holders benefit from this effect, because their risk is lowered, thus 
re-levering the firm after the merger can be useful. Thereby the company can profit 
from tax shields (Weston, in Rock 1987, p 35). 
Furthermore, financing due to reduced transaction costs can diminish costs even 
further, particularly in conglomerate mergers (Levy and Sarnat, 1970). 
 
3.5.1.3 Strategic realignment  
In this case, the acquiring company aims to adapt to changes in the environment. 
Doubtlessly, in practice such adjustments require rapid responses (Weston, in Rock 
1987, p 36). Walker (2000) states various ways in which a company can do so (p 55).  
• The firm can expand its business geographically.  
• Furthermore it might expand product lines, thus targeting economies of scope.  
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• The third option would be to augment market share through the acquisition of 
a rival or competitor.  
• Last but not least, the corporation can diversify.  
In his paper, Walker (2000) further analyzed the abnormal returns of a sample of 278 
American acquisitions from 1980-1996. In so doing, he reached the conclusion that 
expanding geographically was the best value creating strategy for acquiring 
shareholders before augmenting market share. All other strategies were not 
beneficial. (Table V, p 62 – for more research on creating value see section 3.8). 
 
3.5.2  Information theory 
This theory states that mergers and takeovers can lead to a revaluation of ownership 
due to new information that is made available during negotiations and the bargaining 
process (Weston, in Rock 1987, p 36). One form is for instance the “sitting-on-a-
goldmine-hypothesis by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983). It states that the approach 
of a bidder can induce the market to revaluate previously undervalued stock. In 
addition they introduced the “kick-in-the-pants” explanation, which encourages 
management to “implement a higher-valued operating strategy” (Weston, in Rock 
1987, p 36). 
 
3.5.2.1 The q-ratio 
Moreover it may be cheaper to purchase a firm, than to start building an own facility. 
Whether such a strategy can be successful depends on the q-ratios within an 
industry, which is defined as “the ratio of the market value of a company’s shares to 
the replacement costs of the assets represented by those shares” (lbid, p 36). In case 
this ratio is below 1 for one firm, another company should think about acquiring it, 
instead of building a proper line of production the reason being that the costs of 
replacement of the acquired assets is higher than the price paid.  
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The relevance of q-ratio theory for the explanation of waves was however limited. 
The findings clearly showed that q-ratios of acquired companies were above 1.0 
(Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2006, p 33). 
 
3.5.3  Agency problems theory 
The problem has already introductorily been described and related to issues of 
minority shareholders and free riders. The agency problem theory in this context 
states once more that the threat of takeovers can possibly discipline managers 
 
3.6  Sources of value for whom? 
So far, the climate and motives of M&A have been discussed. A very central aspect 
has yet to be answered: Even if companies operating in a proper climate and having 
motives to justify a takeover or merger decide to execute a certain transaction, can 
value be created? If so, under which circumstances and who are the beneficiaries? 
First of all, there are two main parties involved in such a transaction. As a matter of 
fact, target-firm shareholders are affected in a different way than acquiring-firm 
shareholders as far as value creation is concerned.  
 
3.6.1  Target-firm shareholder wealth 
The shareholders being acquired usually benefit from large premia being paid. 
Evidence is offered for instance by Jensen and Ruback (1983). According to their 
findings, target shareholders earn significantly positive returns on the announcement 
date, both for mergers and successful tender offers (lbid, p 14). Table 3 (p 9) 
demonstrates that successful target firm experience an increase of 29% in stock 
price on the day of announcement.  
Unsuccessful tender offers also lead to increased stock prices on announcement 
date. Further development of stock prices heavily depend on whether a new offer is 
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being made or not. If so, stock prices rise, if not however, returns fall back to pre-
announcement levels (lbid, p 14). 
Furthermore Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that a certain resistance of 
management can lead to even higher premia, increasing the benefits for target 
shareholders (p 40). Forms of resistance can be to either encourage competing 
bidders, or to trigger actions of courts. Nonetheless such actions should not result in 
an entire termination of the process, because this is usually not in the interest of 
shareholders (lbid).  
 
The associated problem is that target management is highly likely to lose occupation 
as soon as the acquirer takes over. They might therefore be inclined to take 
measures to fend off takeover bids that would actually be in the interest of target 
shareholders (Harris, 1980, p 514). This can be considered as an agency problem, 
which can however be overcome with the implementation of golden parachutes, 
granting target management a certain payoff. As a result, target shareholders may be 
able to capture more synergy gains (Harris, 1990, p 623). 
Evidence of the different methods is provided by Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978). In 
their sample consisting of 88 firms, they found that on the date of announcement 
targets which resisted the bid experienced a higher return of 19.79% compared to 
16.5% for non-resisting targets (Table 1, p 510). Nevertheless 15 of these 21 
resisting targets were not taken over in the subsequent ten months. As a 
consequence they exhibit large cumulative losses. 20 months after the takeover, the 
non-successful resisting targets show -12%, whereas resisting successful targets had 
a return of around 11%. Targets which did not resist at all also evince a slightly 
negative return of -3% (lbid).  
Another interesting result is that many targets performed abnormally low preceding 
the takeover announcement, indicating that current management was not able to 
capture gains accordingly (p 514).  
Thus, resisting managers can be awarded with golden parachutes, making them 
more willing to letting a takeover succeed. Target shareholders can benefit from 
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defensive behavior of management only if the company is still overtaken. Otherwise 
no premium is paid and the firm stays in the hands of incumbent management.  
 
3.6.2  Acquiring-firm shareholder wealth 
Despite the largely positive returns earned by target-firm shareholders, the benefits to 
the acquiring-firm shareholders are more complicated to grasp. 
While Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that “corporate takeovers generate positive 
gains, that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders do not 
lose” (p 47), an opposition is not at all convinced of the benefits for acquiring firms: 
“Researchers (…) have found them to average close to zero and to be negative for 
some categories of offers” (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989, p 12).  
In analyzing tender offers from three decades, evidence from Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989) suggests that this might be due to the difference in size. When the bidder is 
large compared to the target, the increase in acquiring-firm stock price will be 
smaller. These findings are consistent with research on mergers by Asquith, Bruner 
and Mullins (1983) which found that abnormal returns for bidders increase with the 
size of the target (p 138).  
Furthermore, if a bid is resisted by target management, the returns for the acquiring 
firm will decrease (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989, p 18).  
Last but not least, Bradley Desai and Kim (1988) report that multiple bidders result in 
higher payoffs for the target firm and at the same time “decrease the returns to 
acquiring firms” (p 25).   
As mentioned under 3.5.1.3, Walker also found that only two of six strategies were 
value creating for acquiring-shareholders.  
Thus, there are two sides to the creation of wealth in the context of acquisitions. 
Target resistance can increase returns on the side of the target, at the same time 
decreasing payoffs to acquiring-firm shareholders. 
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Target-shareholders are likely to benefit with average returns of around 30%. 
Acquiring-firm shareholders can however often not capture the benefits, partly owing 
to relatively small gains compared to overall size.  
Another reason often associated with the rather poor performance of acquiring 
companies stems from mispricing of targets. This phenomenon shall be described 
more closely in the next section (see 3.7.1.1 “The winner’s curse”) as it needs to be 
embedded into the process of valuation.  
 
3.7   Special cases in M&A 
3.7.1  Valuation 
If one company is acquired by another corporation, a very delicate and complex 
process is required to ensure a smooth transaction.  
As one can imagine, the most difficult task in this framework is to price an entire firm 
at a specific point in time. The fact is that a corporation underlies constant 
fluctuations in value, especially if shares are traded on the stock market.  
This does of course cause a number of problems, especially under the common but 
controversial assumption of market efficiency, meaning that “relevant information is 
impounded into the price of financial assets” (Dimson and Mussavian, 2000, p 1 and 
investopedia.com, 2010). This implies that not solely current earnings, but also 
expectations about the future are encompassed in stock price calculations. Clearly, 
this aggravates the true value estimation, making the procedure prone to over- or 
under ratings.  
 
3.7.1.1 The Winner’s curse 
One example of how such an overestimation can negatively influence the outcome of 
an acquisition is best described with the Winner’s curse hypothesis. It affirms that in a 
fight of control over a certain target, the competing party which unknowingly 
overvalues the object has a higher probability to win the race (Varaiya, 1988, p 209). 
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After the acquisition, however, the acquirer is cursed by the overpayment. The 
likelihood of occurrence is also dependent on “the degree of competition” (lbid, p 
211). Varaiya concludes that two thirds of the sample companies overestimated the 
benefits arising from the acquisition (p 216). This result also supports an idea by Roll 
(1986) which is universally referred to as hubris.  
 
3.7.2.2 Hubris 
In his paper, Roll (1986) takes a more psychological standpoint from which he argues 
that market participants do not always behave rationally (p 199). Therefore they do 
not realize that valuations can be wrong and still bid despite knowing of the winner’s 
curse’s existence.  
If they would behave rationally however, they would only decide to acquire a 
company “below the current market price” (p 212). This is why “hubris is necessary to 
explain why managers do not abandon these bids also since reflection would suggest 
that such bids are likely to represent positive errors in valuation” (lbid).  
Roll (1986) expected combined value of target and acquirer to fall owing to the 
observation of hubris. But findings of how acquiring-shareholder wealth is affected 
were very contradicting; therefore it was hard to confirm the existence of hubris. At 
the same time there was no evidence against it.  
Allegedly hubris can play a role in the acquisition process and should nonetheless be 
considered by acquiring-firm management, when evaluating a potential target. One 
must bear in mind that the bargaining process still takes place between human 
beings who underlie certain psychological patterns and more importantly, emotions.  
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3.8  Global M&A activity  
Over the past decades, the activity and at the same time the volume of M&A has 
increased significantly. To be more precise, the volume skyrocketed, augmenting 12-
fold from 1990 until 2000 (Kleinert and Klodt, 2000, p 1).  
 
Illustration 4. Zephyr Annual M&A Report, 2009, p 2. 
In the year 2009 M&A value equaled to $3621 billion. That amounts to a decrease of 
15% compared to the year 2008, where the transaction volume resulted to $4242 
billion (Zephyr Annual M&A Report 2009, p 1. for reason being the world economic 
crisis, see Chapter 4). Globally 64.981 deals were signed off, as illustrated by the 
graph above. The record year is considered to be 2007. 
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Illustration 5 from Zephyr Annual M&A Report, 2009, p 6. 
As can be seen in illustration 5, in the year 2007, Western Europe had the highest-
value deals. In the years 2008, 2009 M&A activity decreased over proportionally, thus 
allowing North America to obtain the first rank.  
An interesting fact is that besides the comparatively small region Oceania, Far East 
and Central Asia was the only global region that succeeded in increasing value after 
the cut in 2008. This again indicates higher liquidity within the Chinese markets.  
Illustration 6 shows that in 2008, most M&A activity occurs within the banking sector. 
Machinery, equipment and furniture is ranked third, in front of the chemicals, rubber 
and plastic industry. Globally speaking, the metal and metal products industry 
branch, in which voestalpine operates, is ranked in 9th position (Zephyr Annual M&A 
Report, 2009, p 9). Within Western Europe, the volume of this particular sector is 
higher than its value (p 32). On the one hand this indicates that various mergers and 
acquisitions take place in  
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Illustration 6 from Zephyr Annual M&A Report, 2009, p 10. 
the metal and metal products branch. On the other hand it might imply that vertical 
acquisition is more common, because it is less costly to for instance acquire 
distributors or service providers than a rival company at the same stage of the 
production process, hence leading to more takeovers at lower values.  
Clustering might be explained with either a neoclassical hypothesis, arguing that 
shocks hit the banking sector particularly hard, or with the help of the behavioral 
approach, which would probably suggest that stocks within the banking sector were 
overvalued, leading to elevated M&A activity.  
With having the world wide crisis in mind (see Chapter 4), it becomes quite evident, 
that the neoclassical approach is probably the better explanation: various banks had 
to be bailed out as a consequence. With a deal volume of $36.240 million The Royal 
Bank of Scotland Group plc was acquired by HM Treasury and is ranked number 
one. Rank 2 is represented by Lloyds Banking Group plc (deal volume $22.287 
million), HSBC is positioned fourth (Zephyr Annual M&A Report, 2009, p 25).  
Just to demonstrate the dimensions, it is worth mentioning that RBS was the fourth 
and HSBC the fifth biggest bank in the world in 2009 (diePresse.com, 2009). 
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Presumably, in most of the cases banks were rather in the position of the target than 
the bidder.  
 
3.9  M&A in Austria 
3.9.1  The M&A market 
The Austrian M&A market is comparatively small, with an economic landscape mainly 
shaped by SMEs (small and medium enterprises) and a manageable amount of 
multinationals, such as the OMV, Swarovsky or the voestalpine (Hack, 2004 in 
Martinius 2004, p 52). A large proportion of Austrian companies are family-owned.  
 
Illustration 7. Zephyr Annual M&A Report, 2009, p 31. 
 
The overall market was however not spared from the consequences of the decline in 
world market activity: in 2008, there was a decrease of around 20% to 30% (Fellner 
and Luiki, 2009). Related to volume, Austria’s number of deals dropped from 29 in 
2007 to 18 (2008) and finally to 12 (2009) (Zephyr Annual M&A Report, 2009, p 31).  
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Regarding value, the Austrian economy has had a comparatively low involvement, 
measured in terms of total Western Europe transactions.  
In 2009 Austria was ranked 14th, solely accounting for 1.2% of total Western 
European value, or for 24% of the value of its big neighbor Germany (taken from 
Illustration 7). The largest deal was the institutional buyout of Constantia Packaging 
AG (Ranked 15th of the Top 20 value deals, 2009). 
 
3.9.2   Banks and M&A 
The importance of banks in Austria is remarkable, because apart from financing, they 
also engage in national and cross-border transactions, both as buyers and sellers 
(Fellner and Luiki, 2009). A close bank-company relationship (section 2.4.2) can thus 
be acknowledged. The largest banks are Unicredit Bank Austria, Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank (Ranked 79th of Top 1000 banks worldwide) and the Erste Group (Rank 
88) (diePresse.com, 2009).  
 
3.9.3  Risks and anti-trust regulations 
Due to Austria being a member of the European Union, economic risks associated 
with M&A activity is comparatively low. Nonetheless, the European Commission has 
the power to reject certain activities for fear that European anti-trust law is violated. 
Also, Austrian authorities must approve the process. In the past, there were however 
hardly any concerns, because “macro-economic arguments” were often pushed to 
the foreground (Hack, 2004 in Martinius 2004, p 54). Therefore the Austrian M&A 
market can be considered as a safe harbor for transactions.  
 
3.10   Concluding remarks to Chapter 3 
Companies face the need to restructure thus adapting to changes in the 
environment. Mergers and acquisitions are a form to expand capacity and can occur 
in a variety of forms.  
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A closer look on merger waves has shown how motives have changed with time, not 
always pursuing value-maximizing strategies. Certain detours were necessary in 
order to make companies learn from their mistakes.  
Apart from climatic reasons, there are numerous motives why companies engage in 
M&A activities. Synergies are probably the most common ones, but also strategic 
motives can play a crucial role.   
Target shareholders benefit most from such activities, while acquiring-firm 
shareholders may not capture gains accordingly, especially if multiple bidders and 
target resistance increase the price to pay.  
Valuation can be a difficult task. The success of M&A heavily depends on the 
accuracy of this process. Managers must be aware that the winner’s curse and hubris 
can lead to excessive bidding, overpaying the target and subsequently suffering from 
the consequences.  
Global activity experienced a cut by 15% in 2009, mainly due to the financial crisis, 
which also led to the majority of deals shifting to the banking sector.  
The main players are Western Europe and North America.  
Austria’s M&A activity declined by 20-30% in 2008, in spite of the market being 
relatively small. The economy solely accounted for 1.2% of total Western European 
M&A value.  
When planning M&A in Austria however, the strong interference of politics and the 
important role of banks have to be considered. 
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4   THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
 
4.1   The commodity crisis  
The year 2004 is a prominent date for the worldwide steel industry. Up until then the 
world market had gotten accustomed to China whelming it with coke.  
However, based on the persisting boom in the People’s Republic of China, suddenly 
the 140 million tons produced annually are required by companies of their own 
industry. Thereby market rates increase drastically from 60 to over 450 Dollars per 
ton (Manager Magazin, 2004).  Cautious calculations assign an additional burden of 
at least 2,5 billion Euro for the industrial middle class in Germany (Steinkohle Portal, 
2004). 
As if that were not enough, China falls back on scrap trade in order to satisfy the 
constant hunger for steel. Nonetheless this raw material is indispensible for the steel 
industry, which is put increasingly under pressure. In August 2004 for instance, scrap 
of sort 2 registers an incredible ascent of 145% (Stahl Online, 2004) and additionally 
afflicts steel producers. At the end of the year China finally imported 13 million tons 
more than it exported (Kerkoff, 2005, p 2).   
Later this sequence of events shall become known as the commodity crisis. 
Austrian production is largely spared from the consequences and is able to boost 
output of raw iron, crude steel, flat- and long products steadily until 2008 (WKO 
Fachverband Bergbau-Stahl, 2008b). 
In 2005 China remains the center of attention. The fear, the net importer could 
unexpectedly develop into a net exporter is first being manifested (Kerkoff, 2005, p 2) 
and is confirmed in the subsequent years, as seen in Illustration 8. 
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Illustration 8. Stahl Online 2010. Monthly output of China. 
 
Critical voices are raised concerning the energy policy within the European Union 
(Stahl Online, 2005), which is much more strict than regulations imposed on Chinese 
production, thus distorting competition.  
In Germany, emission trading puts additional charges on the production process 
(Brüninghaus, 2005); the room for maneuver of national steel producing companies is 
hence decreased considerably. Moreover the energy-intensive sector is increasingly 
burdened with high electricity prices (Stahl Online, 2005).  
 
4.2   The world economic crisis  
During the year 2006, the steel industry can largely recover from the negative effects 
associated with the commodity crisis (Stahl Online, 2005) and in 2007 the world steel 
production reaches the highest output ever measured: 1.3 billion tons (Schmidt, 
2008).  
However by the end of 2008, the world economic crisis strikes slightly delayed. This 
time the real economy is severely hit. 
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The crisis originated on the financial markets in the early summer of 2007. From then 
on, it caused several insolvencies and high losses within the industry. On the one 
hand, it spread into dynamic emerging markets, which had considerably propelled the 
development of the steel sector during past years (Kerkoff, 2009). On the other hand, 
however, it also infected other branches of industry, such as the automobile sector. 
Already in October 2008, an author believes that car manufacturers might soon be in 
the biggest crisis since 1973 (BoerseARD.de, 2008). 
The high dependence on clients such as the engineering industry, producers of metal 
goods and of course automobile manufacturers hits steel producers especially hard, 
mainly because they are the primary link in the value chain. In Germany for instance, 
around one quarter of the annual steel production is consumed by the automobile 
sector (Spiegel Online, 2009). 
As seen in Illustration 9, the monthly production of crude steel in Europe almost 
collapses from September 2008 onwards with a drastic decrease from 17 million to 
only 9 million tons in December 2008. With solely 60 percent, the load of operating 
facilities reaches a long-time low (Kerkoff, 2009). 
Austria is a comparatively small market with an annual production of around 7.6 
million tons (WKO Fachverband Berbau-Stahl, 2008a) and is therefore not hit as 
hard. The Alpine state is ranked 23rd among the most important steel producing 
countries worldwide (lbid). By comparison, Germany is in seventh position with six-
fold output of around 46 million tons per year (lbid). 
Also in 2008, issues such as the temporary strains placed on the liquidity of banks 
and the steadily growing exports of China are discussed. In this context, the 
catastrophic environmental circumstances under which the production of steel takes 
place in the far east, are again highlighted.  
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Illustration 9. Stahl Online 2010b. Monthly output of the European Union. 
 
In the same year, the European Commission files an anti-dumping petition at request 
of Eurofer against China. The complaint is mainly based on unfair commercial 
practices. Especially the suspicion of missing standards in the fields of competition, 
environment, intellectual property rights, might lead to subsidized low prizes 
(Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl, 2008). Thus, anti-dumping duties shall prevent exports 
from growing and thereby impairing the domestic steel industry. As a matter of fact, 
steel exports to Europe amounted to 1 million tons in 2005. In the following year, the 
amount had already increased fivefold and 2007 finally reached 10 million tons 
(Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl, 2008).  
The year 2009 will go down in history as the year with an elusive 8% drop in the 
world steel production. Without China, which had been supported by intense stimulus 
packages and got off comparatively lightly, the reduction even amounts to 22% 
(Kerkoff, 2010). 
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4.3   Outlook  
At the end of 2009 the steel industry already presents a slightly friendlier picture: 
Overall, an amount of 1.33 billion tons of crude steel had been melted. This number 
is only a little behind the pre-crisis level of 1,346 tons (Kerkoff, 2010). 
The faster-than expected recovery process of the car manufacturing industry lead to 
an ameliorated situation regarding orders, however, according to analysts there are 
still various issues that could threaten a sustainable upswing.  
On the one hand the worldwide recovery has largely been borne by vast stimulus 
packages that yet have to be financed (lbid). On the other hand liquidity within the 
markets is still restricted. According to a survey conducted in February 2010 by the 
IFO institute, almost 40% of the companies questioned, find fault with the current 
access to credits (lbid). 
The big question remains nonetheless, how prices of commodities will develop in the 
near future. It appears likely that a steady and elevated demand from China will lead 
to rising prices (lbid). But also the fact that a long-term benchmark system for the 
pricing of resources will be abandoned for short-lived spot market coordination 
makes the underlying raw materials prone to high volatilities. This significantly 
hampers a secure and stable way of pricing (lbid).  
Furthermore it must not be overlooked that market power of raw material suppliers 
has tremendously gained momentum during the past years. As a result there are 
solely three major companies – the Australian BHP Billiton with 17% market share, 
behind the British-Australian number two, Rio Tinto with 19% and the Brazilian Vale 
with astonishing 33% (Kerkoff, 2010b) market share – which cater more than two 
thirds of the overseas iron ore demand. The announced increase in prices by almost 
90% would for instance cause the German steel industry to pay an additional 3 billion 
Euros (lbid). It is doubtful that the industry can absorb this surplus load.  
Concluding, the recovery stands on wobbly legs. It remains to be seen how the steel 
industry will perform in the months to come. 
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4.4   M&A in the steel industry  
The world’s biggest steel producer Arcelormittal employs 310,000 people in 60 
countries worldwide. Due to this representative position, it shall be analyzed how 
M&A activity in the steel industry reacted to the crisis in the world and in Europe.   
In 2007, when the resource crisis had been overcome and the overall outlook in the 
steel industry started to brighten up, the giant was highly engaged in countries such 
as Saudi Arabia, the USA, Argentina, China, Mozambique, Mexiko or Senegal. It also 
acquired companies in Europe such as the 77% stake in the German RAG AG, 
facilities in France, and a 100% stake in the steel galvanizing Estonian Galvex OÜ. 
Last but not least Arcelormittal bought 100% of the Austrian steel distribution 
company Eisen Wagner GmbH, which sold 60,000 tonnes of steel in 2007 
(Arcelormittal, Highlights 2007). 
This shows that M&A activity in the steel industry was at a very high level, which 
could also be kept during 2008. Acquisitions included steel manufacturers and 
distributors in Venezuela, Costa Rica, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, the United 
States, as well as iron ore mines in Brazil and Australia. The only months without 
activity are March and October (Arcelormittal, Highlights 2008). 
The drastic cut in M&A activity becomes apparent, when looking at the year 2009, 
which solely comprised a divestment activity in the Canadian Wabush mines. The 
year 2010 starts with an acquisition of 28.8% of the Indian steel producer Uttam 
Galva, implying a slightly better overall outlook in the steel branch (Arcelormittal, 
Highlights 2009).  
 
4.5   Concluding remarks to Chapter 4  
Arcelormittal is hence a perfect example of how the world economy affected M&A 
activity of steel manufacturers.  
Whereas in 2007 solely the financial sector experienced troubles, September 2008 
marked the beginning of decreasing demand in the real economy resulting in a cut in 
M&A activity, which peaked in the 8% drop in world steel production in 2009. Mergers 
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and acquisitions were low, mainly because companies faced the uncertainty of how 
to finance future investments (consistent with 3.8 Global M&A activity, 3.9 M&A in 
Austria). 
 
 
5   COMPANY ANALYSIS 
 
5.1   History – shared paths 
In the following section I would like to shortly describe the historical backgrounds of 
voestalpine and Böhler Uddeholm and thereby show important developments as well 
as the companies’ roots. The source of the subsequent data is the documentary 
section of voestalpine (Voestalpine AG, 2010) and the information provided on the 
homepage of Böhler Uddeholm (Böhler Uddeholm AG, 2010). 
In the year 1870 the brothers Böhler & Co open business after having negotiated an 
exclusive agency contract with Baron Mayr-Melnhof, which granted the distribution of 
the steel products produced at the smeltery Kapfenberg. A change in ownership of 
the smeltery leaves the contract untouched. In the following years countries such as 
Germany, Russia, France, Great Britain, but also Japan and Australia are supplied 
with products such as Schnellarbeitsstahl and welding rod. After having purchased 
the smeltery, the Böhler & Co lose ownership to the Germans in the year of the 
Anschluss, 1938. 
In the same year, the voestalpine as it is known today is founded in Linz. Primarily as 
a subsidiary of the German Reichswerke, in 1941 the site commences intensive 
production of tanks. With the invasion of US troops 1945 in Linz, the German 
proprietorship gets confiscated. On grounds of the nationalization act 1946, both 
Böhler and the subsidiary, which is renamed to „Vereinigte Österreichische Eisen- 
und Stahlwerke AG“ (VÖEST),  fall to the Republic of Austria.   
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In the consequent years, the production facility of the VÖEST, which is fostered by 
debenture capital that is provided for the reconstruction of Western Europe under the 
so called Marshall Plan, can soon be established as a competitive business. 
Administration and coordination among the enterprise are tightened, in order to 
increase efficiency.  
A noteworthy fact is that already 4 years after the end of war, engineers of the 
VÖEST made one of the most significant inventions of the steel industry 
(Sandgruber, 2008). The so called LD (Linz Donawitz) method allowed the 
manufacture of low carbon steel, thus decreasing costs compared to ordinary 
processes by 30 to 50 percent (lbid). 
During the postwar period, Böhler however posts mainly losses, which have to be 
covered by the state.  
1973 is another remarkable year for the two companies. Under the governance of 
chancellor Bruno Kreisky, all Austrian steel manufacturers, such as the 
Österreichisch-Alpine Montangesellschaft, Böhler, Schoeller-Bleckmann and VÖEST 
among others, are consolidated. The VOEST-ALPINE group is born. 
Already 1975, Böhler is being subsumed with Schoeller-Bleckmann and Steirische 
Gussstahlwerke. The 100 percent subsidiary of the VÖEST-ALPINE is renamed 
Vereinigte Edelstahlwerke (VEW). 
Four years later a restructuring of the mother company results in four divisions and a 
slight modification: the concern loses the Ö and gains an O instead. In 1990 the 
VOEST-ALPINE group buys the Swedish Uddeholm, which is fused with Böhler one 
year later.  
As a consequence, the Böhler Uddeholm group is being founded. Shortly after this 
event the company manages the economic turn-around, which is almost certainly 
also a result of profound restructurings.   
The VOEST-ALPINE group, as it had been known up to date, seized to exist. Since 
1995, both companies strike new paths.  
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5.2  Böhler Uddeholm AG 
During the course of the IPO, the shares of the state of Austria, represented by the 
Österreichischen Industrieholding AG (ÖIAG) first declines from 100 to 72.7% and in 
1996 even further to only 25%. The operative sections of the tool steel producer are 
reduced to four core areas: high performance metals, welding consumables, 
precision strip and special forgings (Böhler Uddeholm, 2007/08 annual report, p 4). 
Acquisitions and investments are meant to ensure growth in the years to follow 
(Böhler Uddeholm AG, 2010). 
In 2001 Austrian private investors of the Fries group buy 25.1% of the company’s 
shares. Two years later the ÖIAG sells the remaining 25%, whereby Böhler-
Uddeholm completes the transformation into a fully privatized enterprise.  
From 2004 to 2006 the stainless steel manufacturer delivers one record years after 
another, as far as sales and operating profit are concerned.  
In the year 2007 Böhler-Uddeholm is acquired by voestalpine, after the transaction 
had been decided by management of the firms involved (Böhler Uddeholm, 2007/08 
annual report, p 7). At this juncture, the company comprises 15,453 employees and 
presents sales of 4.6 Billion €, with earnings before interest and tax being 576 Mio. €.  
The enterprise is a world leader in the manufacture of stainless and tool steel (Böhler 
Uddeholm, 2007/08 annual report, p 3). The facts that tool steel is the top selling 
product, and only 0.1% of the worldwide steel consumption flow into this type of 
production (lbid), lead to the assumption that Böhler Uddeholm is a niche provider. 
This is the reason why the company moved quality of its manufactured goods into the 
foreground. 
The products are manufactured in Austria, Germany, Sweden, Brazil, Italy, Belgium, 
Turkey, USA, Mexico and China (lbid) and consequently being shipped to overall 
100,000 customers in Europe, the United States and Asia (lbid).  
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5.3   voestalpine AG  
Also in 1995 the VOEST-ALPINE AG sells 31.7% of its shares on the stock market 
and breaks free from the hold of the state. After another restructuring in 2001 into the 
divisions steel, motion (2005: automotive), railroad systems and profiles, the 
privatization is finalized in 2005. High investment enables the company to climb up to 
rank 43 in the top 80 list of the world’s biggest steel producers (Worldsteel 
Association, 2008).   
The international presence is further developed, opening up markets in Eastern 
Europe, China, Brasil and Great Britain. With 41,000 employees, the group is 
represented in more than 60 countries with more than 360 production- and 
distribution sites throughout the world. In the financial year of 2008/09, voestalpine 
made a historical profit and realized with sales of 11.6 Billion € the best result of all 
times.  
The succeeding subsection shall portrait the markets and structures of voestalpine, 
not only before, but also after the acquisition of Böhler Uddeholm. Hence changes 
shall be highlighted, which have been caused by the integration of the stainless steel 
producer.  
Sections such as ownership structure and innovation will only be described post-
acquisition, since no significant changes have been found.  
As sources the annual reports of the years 2006/07 and 2008/09 have been used.  
 
5.3.1   Group structure 
Before the acquisition, voestalpine consists of four major divisions. Illustration 10 
shows that division steel is top selling with a percentage of 49% of total revenue.  
After the purchase, Böhler Uddeholm is implemented into the voestalpine group as a 
fifth division stainless steel and ever since accounts for 29% of the enterprise’s sales 
volume. Division steel maintains its importance with 36%, being clearly ahead of 
division railroad systems, which generates 19% of the 2008/09 sales. 
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Illustration 10. Divisions’ earnings. Voestalpine, 2007/08 annual report, p32, 22.  
 
 
5.3.2   Ownership structure and corporate governance 
5.3.2.1  Large shareholders  
With a percentage of 44% the voestalpine group is largely owned by Austrian 
investors. Ranked second, North American investors own a stake of 14%. The strong 
national ties are doubtlessly also justifiable with the historical background and the 
government still having a considerable amount of interest in the company.  
The biggest single shareholders are the banks Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberösterreich 
Invest GmbH&Co OG (15%) and Oberbank (5%) as well as the voestalpine 
employee involvement foundation (10%, voestalpine, 2008/09 annual report, p 15).  
This finding goes in line with research by Shleifer and Vishny, who reported that the 
average holding of large shareholders equals to 15.4%. As theory suggested, large 
shareholders can raise expected profits and generally improve the performance of 
firms (2.4.3.1.The free rider problem and monitoring). 
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 Also this provides evidence for the strong bank-company relationship in Austria as a 
part of a value maximizing strategy. Based on theoretical findings it can therefore be 
assumed that such a relationship does not only discipline managers from 
overinvesting, but more generally creates shareholder value and hence may point 
towards a healthy and stable company (2.4.2. The bank-company relationship | 3.9.2. 
Banks and M&A) 
As already partly mentioned, before the acquisition private Investors held 25.1% of 
Böhler Uddeholm’s shares, which were subsequently sold to voestalpine. This 
facilitated the M&A process, because voestalpine gained influence and only needed 
a smaller amount of minority shareholders to tender (2.4.3.2.  The free rider 
problem in a corporate context).  
How this aspect influenced the actual takeover process and further implications, shall 
be summarized under 6.2.4 Summary 
 
5.3.2.2 Minority shareholders 
Despite comparatively large holdings by banks and employees accounting for 
approximately 30%, the remaining shares are in free float. This is however not 
uncommon, when looking at other companies within the Austrian Traded Index 
(ATX). According to indices.cc, 18 out of 20 companies have more than 50% of their 
shares in free float.  
One implication might be that a raider could face difficulties, if minority shareholders 
are to tender their shares.  
 
5.3.2.3 The board  
The board consists of six officers, each being responsible for one division and 
additionally one member destined for the head of finance. The chief executive officer 
Dr. Wolfgang Eder is thereby also the head of division steel. It is interesting to note 
that the manager Dkfm. Dr. Klaus Raidl of the target company Böhler Uddeholm is 
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still head of the implemented stainless steel division (voestalpine, 2008/09 annual 
report, p 10,11). 
The officers are monitored by the board of directors, which comprises 16 members. 
Among these members are two executive officers of the participating banks, but also 
notaries, the workers’ council and various insurance companies are represented 
(lbid, p 8).  
 
5.3.3  Divisions and products 
Division Steel is occupied with the manufacturing of flat products, that is mainly 
sheets and cast products (voestalpine takeover offer, 2007, p 23). Moreover the 
division possesses a downstream service- and processing section. Among its biggest 
clients are especially the automobile- (25%), engineering- and steel construction- 
(25%) as well as the building industry (18%) (voestalpine, 2008/09 annual report, p 
52).  
Division Stainless Steel (former Böhler Uddeholm). The manufactured products have 
already been mentioned. The engineering- and steel construction industry replaces 
the automobile industry as the most important client (lbid, p 56). However also 
energy-, household- and space industry count with 18%, 11% and 6% to the most 
important customers. Apart from tool steel, the division manufactures also forgings 
for wide-bodied aircrafts, turbine blades, saw band steel and pipelines (lbid, p 56).   
A proper steel production facilitates the production of rails and turnouts of division 
Railroad Systems (voestalpine takeover offer, 2007, p 23). Additionally the division 
devotes itself to the manufacture of wire, seamless tubes and semi-finished industrial 
products (lbid). The railroad industry is by far the most important purchaser, but also 
customers in the energy-, automobile-, and construction industry are being supplied 
(voestalpine, 2008/09 annual report, p 60). 
Division Profiles produces shaped tubes and hollow sections (voestalpine takeover 
offer, 2007, p 23). Furthermore the manufacture encompasses pallets, high racks, 
various elements for road safety and overhead cable masts (lbid). A major part of the 
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production goes to the construction industry (31%), followed by Others (28%), 
automobile- (20%) and logistics industry (17%) (voestalpine, 2008/09 annual report, p 
64). 
The fifth Division Automotive processes aluminum and plastic, creating for instance 
laser-welded circuit boards, bodyworks for automotive vehicles and security-related 
parts (voestalpine takeover offer, 2007, p 23). With 77% the car industry obtains most 
of the produced goods prior to the construction industry with 13%. Germany (60%) is 
without doubt the most important market (voestalpine, 2008/09 annual report, p 68). 
The division’s clients comprise BMW, Audi and Daimler. This is also the reason why 
it had to shut down production for two weeks in 2008 (OÖ Nachrichten, 2008). 
5.3.4  Markets and competitors 
 
Illustration 11. Earnings by regions. Voestalpine, 2006/07 annual report, p 33 and 
2008/09, p 22. 
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The acquisition of Böhler Uddeholm has lead to slight changes in supplied markets, 
as shown in Illustration 11. While Austria, Italy and the Benelux countries marginally 
forfeit some of their weight, Germany gains importance, thus residing in the position 
of the most important market.  
The fact that suddenly Asia appears as an entire market is partly ascribable to the 
acquisition itself (Böhler Uddeholm, 2007/08 annual report, p 21) and partly to 
voestalpine’s increasing commitment to participate on the Asian market. At any rate, 
in the year 2007/08 Böhler Uddeholm generated 12% of its total revenue in Asia 
(lbid).  
Since Europe is the most important market for the voestalpine group, three main 
competitors can be identified (Nachrichten.at, 2010).  
 
5.3.4.1 Salzgitter and Thyssenkrupp 
Both companies are based in Germany. In the year 2009, Salzgitter disclosed sales 
of close to € 7.81 billion, a production output of 4.9 million tons and an operating loss 
of € 387 million (Salzgitter-ag.de, 2010).  
Thyssenkrupp also registered negative results, due to the world economic crisis, 
despite being a bigger player. With annual sales plunging by €12 billion compared to 
2007/08, Thyssenkrupp still reported € 40.5 billion of which € 25.2 billion (62%) have 
been generated in Europe (Thyssenkrupp, 2010b). The operating loss equaled to € 
1.87 billion (Thyssenkrupp, 2010).  
 
5.3.4.2 Arcelormittal 
Annual sales of the steel giant, based in Luxemburg, were down 48% at $ 65 billion 
with a total output of 71 million tons. 47% of total shipments were made to Europe 
(Arcelormittal, Fact book 2009, p 4)..  
This resulted in an operating loss of $1.68 billion compared to the operating income 
of $12.3 billion in the previous year 2008 (lbid).  
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These figures coincide with the numbers presented under 3.5.2, suggesting that 
voestalpine was able to present the best Europe-wide results. This fact is also 
substantiated by Nachrichten.at (2010), underlining the strong market position of this 
Austrian company.  
 
5.3.5   Innovation 
In dynamic industries, innovation should be an important component of a company’s 
strategy, since it can substantially contribute to its success. As a consequence I 
would like to shed more light on voestalpine’s commitment to innovation.  
In the year 2008/09 the company shows slightly lower investments with respect to 
environmental technologies than in previous years. Nevertheless, expenditures on 
existing technologies reach a new all-time high amounting to € 225 million 
(voestalpine, 2008/09 annual report, p 38).  
Constant investment is largely targeted to increase energy- and resource efficiency 
even further (voestalpine, 2008/09 annual report, p 37). New developments have for 
instance helped to decrease CO2 emissions of the site in Linz by 500.000 tons per 
year (lbid, p 38). So called Ultra-Super-Critical-Power-Plants (USC) which promise 
higher degrees of efficiency have accounted apart from other attainments to the 
EMAS environment award which has been granted in 2008 (lbid, p 39).  
Furthermore high expenditures in research and development have lead to innovative 
products (lbid, p 43). The company did not only design unique, high resistant alloys 
and steels such as the Vancron 40, which won the EPMA Award 2007, but was also 
able to attain prestigious projects: the manufaction of the world’s biggest steam 
turbine housing (lbid, p 44).    
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5.3.6  Summary and interpretation 
Voestalpine is embedded into a quite dynamic environment: the steel industry.  
As a producer and therefore primary link in the value chain, the company is prone to 
fluctuations in commodity prices.  
Furthermore the fact that the company generates almost one third of its profits in 
Germany, where the crisis lead to massive retracements, is likely to put additional 
weight on voestalpine’s performance. 
The assumption, the crisis of the automobile industry might not strike the enterprise 
as hard since its automotive division solely contributes 7% to total sales, could not be 
validated. The contrary is however the case: all divisions adduce products to car 
manufacturing industries. Hence, the shortfall of this entire branch presumably 
induces further difficulties.  
As a consequence, voestalpine must be highly responsive to changes in its 
environment, in order to be competitive in the future.  
This shall be assured with 70 years of experience in the field of steel production but 
also through innovative products and efficient manufacturing processes.  
Moreover voestalpine endeavors to generate value for shareholders by growth 
through acquisitions. Whether this strategy creates value in practice shall be 
analyzed in the subsequent section.   
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6   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
6.1   Method and assumptions 
The empirical analysis is conducted with the use of an event study. This method 
requires the definition of various terms, which will be applied during the course of the 
following section.  
 
6.1.1  Defining an event 
An event is defined as a piece of information about the state of a company, which is 
new to the market and has not yet been priced (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Based 
on the assumption of capital market efficiency, old information may hence not be 
defined as such, since it has already been considered in the calculation of the 
present market price. Also, arbitrage shall not be possible. Thereby the stock price of 
a company is dependent on the provision of information and reacts accordingly. 
In this context it is vital to state that anticipated information can hinder observations 
(Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997). It is a type of information, which is only known 
to a particular group of market participants and is sometimes also referred to as 
leakage. Anticipated information consequently leads to delayed market reactions, 
because the signal is not perceived by all market participants simultaneously. This is 
also the reason, why the time frame around which an event is often observed, has to 
be stretched accordingly in order to allow for such imperfect happening. 
 
6.1.2  Setting the time frame  
There are two time frames upon which the observation is conducted. On the one 
hand, a time frame for the estimation of the market model needs to be set.  
According to previous studies, this window shall be one year, thus accounting for 
seasonal variations.  
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The second time frame is linked to the event itself. Due to the existence of leakages 
resulting from anticipated information, it would be negligent to base the analysis on 
the assumption of efficient capital markets. A time frame is therefore wrapped around 
the event, capturing also delayed market reactions. 
 
6.1.3   Choosing a benchmark 
The aim of an event study is to isolate an event and test for reaction on the value of 
the company by observing stock price responses.  
This is the reason, why a benchmark has to be configured to account for returns the 
overall market makes. This benchmark has to be big enough to be unaffected by a 
certain event, since otherwise both benchmark and returns of the company would 
react, leading to zero abnormal returns. This phenomenon is called problem of 
endogenity. The event would therefore falsely be held to not have a significant impact 
(Goerke, 2008). 
 
6.1.4  The chronology  
The chronology of the acquisition of Böhler Uddeholm by voestalpine was as follows: 
On Friday, March 16th 2007, stock prices of Böhler Uddeholm rose unexpectedly by 
26.57% (log return to price). The buyer of the equity package remained unknown, the 
Financial Market Authority (FMA) started however to trace the irregular market 
movements.  
After the weekend, on March 19th the British fund CVC announced that talks with the 
Fries group, which held almost 21%, had been made. Moreover CVC declared the 
intention to submit a tender offer. From the theory previously introduced, the proposal 
can be considered as a friendly bid, since CVC asked for the board’s consent 
beforehand. 
On March 28th however, CEO Dkfm. Dr. Klaus Raidl of Böhler Uddeholm pronounced 
himself against the bid.  
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One day later, on March 29th 2007, Böhler Uddeholm and voestalpine held a joint 
press conference. In so doing, voestalpine stated to take over 21% of the Fries 
investor Group and at the same time made a bid for at least 50% of the stock held by 
minority shareholders at a price of €69 per share. After this announcement rumors 
increased, saying that a hostile counterbid appeared to be likely.  
By April 11th, the acquisition of the pre-determined 21% was completed. Furthermore 
voestalpine CEO Dr. Eder notifies the public that an increase of equity is not 
necessary. It might not have been a good idea to raise equity on the market, as 
theory by Wurgler (see 2.9 The Pecking-Order theory) suggests. Furthermore I 
believe that voestalpine wanted to send positive signals to the market, when it 
announced the acquisition was possible with debt financing. This indicated that cash 
flows and future expectations were high and that the company was confident to repay 
obligations. 
The initial bid was composed as follows: 40.313.660 stocks should be purchased at a 
price of €69, resulting in an obligation of €2.781 million. Thereby voestalpine gained 
79% of the 51.000.000 stocks outstanding. Together with the 21% of the Fries group, 
voestalpine owned Böhler Uddeholm to 100%. In October 2007, voestalpine decided 
to issue debt in the form of a hybrid bond. The volume was € 1 billion. In June 2008 
another bond with €500 million and a club deal of €1.5 billion was signed. Finally in 
November 2008 the last bond with €333 million was issued (voestalpine, 2008/09 
annual report, p 29). Total debt obligations hence equaled €3.500 million. 
On May 18th, the bid was raised to €73 per share. The deal was finalized on June 4th. 
As a conclusion, the announcement day was on March 29th, when the deal was first 
announced. Information might however already have been anticipated before this 
date. To allow for possible leakages, the event window is set to +/- 10 days. 
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6.1.5  Further procedures  
The data set for subsequent analysis comprised three basic figures.  
o Stock prices of the companies Böhler Uddeholm and voestalpine were 
provided by wienerboerse.at and have been adjusted for dividend 
payments and splits. For the underlying event study closing prices were 
used, as commonly accepted.  
o The ATX was defined as the market, because it is considered to be big 
enough to avoid previously mentioned endogenity problems associated 
with benchmarks. 
o Information, which can be defined as an event were supplied by Sirca 
and Thomson Reuters.  
Before abnormal returns can be calculated, α and β have to be approximated, using 
the estimation window.  
(1)   Rit =  α I + β I Rmt 
Rit  is the log return of the stock on a specified date t 
Rmt  is the log return of the market portfolio on a specified date t 
α I can be considered as the autonomous return 
β I indicates to which extent the company moves with the underlying index.  
 
Then, the values for alpha and beta are inserted into the formula (2), in order to 
receive the expected return.  
(2)    E ( Rit ) = α I + β I   
Finally the expected return is subtracted from the actual log return, yielding the 
abnormal return for the given date.  
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6.2   Discussion. Results and interpretation 
6.2.1  Performance in the announcement window 
The alpha, which is an indication of how much better the company performs 
compared to the index, equals to 0.00417 for voestalpine and 0.00129 for Böhler 
Uddeholm (Appendix 1.1). Owing to the fact that calculations were based on pre-
announcement data, this is a sign that voestalpine already had a good performance 
before the acquisition. Nevertheless, the sample size is relatively low (50 
observations only) and shall hence not be overrated.  
Furthermore the following observations were made: voestalpine’s beta of 1.41 shows 
that the company’s stock is more volatile than the market portfolio, whereas the beta 
of 0.77 for Böhler Uddeholm indicates less volatility.  
Cumulative abnormal returns for the period, which included 10 trading days pre-, 
post- and the announcement date are displayed in Illustration 12.  
The main appreciation in abnormal returns of Böhler Uddeholm took place on March 
16th. At the same time abnormal returns of the late acquirer voestalpine dropped. 
Theory explains this reaction stating that an acquisition itself does not necessarily 
have to be beneficial to acquiring shareholders. Only when obstacles associated to 
acquisitions (see Section 3) are overcome, this type of shareholder is likely to profit.  
The question remains however, why voestalpine’s returns reacted at all. At this point 
in time, the circumstances were quite unknown and no one was officially handled as 
a buyer. 
Thus, the market appeared to expect that voestalpine might be a potential buyer. As 
a matter of fact, Austrian politics is not very fond of international buyers, who lay their 
hands on domestic companies (see 3.4 The proper climate). Also the fact that 
voestalpine and Böhler Uddeholm had a joint history made it probable that 
voestalpine would help out and act as a white knight, in case another foreign 
company would signal interest. 
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Date Abnormal V Abnormal B CAR voest CAR Böhler 
15.03.2007 -1,84% 4,75% -5,72% 8,30% 
16.03.2007 -4,79% 26,32% -10,51% 34,62% 
19.03.2007 1,11% -15,99% -9,40% 18,63% 
20.03.2007 3,86% -4,93% -5,53% 13,70% 
21.03.2007 2,49% 1,94% -3,04% 15,64% 
22.03.2007 -2,10% -2,12% -5,14% 13,51% 
23.03.2007 -2,07% 1,97% -7,21% 15,48% 
26.03.2007 -1,98% -0,46% -9,19% 15,02% 
27.03.2007 -0,10% 2,79% -9,30% 17,81% 
28.03.2007 2,08% 0,56% -7,21% 18,38% 
29.03.2007 -1,86% 0,01% -9,08% 18,39% 
30.03.2007 2,32% -0,87% -6,76% 17,52% 
02.04.2007 -3,33% 0,94% -10,09% 18,46% 
03.04.2007 0,23% -0,55% -9,86% 17,91% 
04.04.2007 -3,41% 1,14% -13,28% 19,05% 
05.04.2007 -0,45% 0,06% -13,73% 19,11% 
10.04.2007 1,68% -0,27% -12,05% 18,84% 
11.04.2007 -3,03% -2,84% -15,08% 16,00% 
12.04.2007 0,25% 1,20% -14,83% 17,20% 
13.04.2007 -0,93% -0,87% -15,76% 16,34% 
16.04.2007 -0,39% -0,60% -16,15% 15,74% 
Table 1. Abnormal returns +/-10 days around the announcement date. 
Nevertheless, the increase in abnormal returns might as well be a sign for a leakage, 
exploited of by insiders. The scenario might have been that managers of the 
voestalpine unofficially declared interest before the overall market learned about the 
changed market conditions.  
The announcement of CVC to acquire Böhler Uddeholm on March 19th lead to a 
decline in the target company’s stock price. This might be explainable with the fact 
that in such a setting, shareholders would not be paid a premium, but only the Fries 
group selling 21% of the company’s stock would benefit from the deal. The market 
anticipated the changing environment and adapted returns accordingly.  
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Illustration 12. Cumulative abnormal returns pre-, post- and on announcement date 
Voestalpine’s augmenting returns might be explainable with either one of the 
following scenarios. On the one hand, investors might have believed that an 
acquisition of Böhler by voestalpine now seemed less likely, since CVC came out as 
the buyer. Therefore the negative effects associated with acquiring companies were 
undone and stock prices rose.  
On the other hand however, having in mind Austrian politics and its aversion against 
foreign buyers, investors could have believed that an acquisition was still likely, and 
that such a purchase would be beneficial for voestalpine, leading to the increase in 
price. 
On the announcement date, the happenings already appear to have been greatly 
considered in current stock prices, since there were little movements.  Largely, the 
stock price of Böhler Uddeholm had already appreciated on March 16th, thereby 
taking out potential volume. Also it appears very likely that information had been 
anticipated earlier in the process, leaking into the returns of the announcement date.  
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6.2.2  Target-firm shareholder wealth 
The results are consistent with the theory introduced earlier, suggesting that target 
firm shareholders benefit from high premia being paid (see 3.6.1 Target-firm 
shareholder wealth). This evidently holds true for the underlying acquisition. As can 
be seen in illustration 13, the premium for stockholders who possessed shares for 
three months equaled 12.6% (see illustration 13). This premium already included the 
stock appreciation of March 16th. 
Therefore it becomes apparent that target-firm shareholders are able to capture the 
gains of an acquisition over proportionally, as so often observed also in papers by 
Jensen and Ruback. Moreover illustration 14 demonstrates that abnormal long-term 
returns for the target were significant.  
 
 
Illustration 13. Premia being paid, based on average stock prices in EUR. voestalpine 
takeover offer, 2007. 
 
6.2.3  Acquiring-firm shareholder wealth  
The question is whether the acquisition was in the interest of acquiring-firm 
shareholders as far as value creation is concerned.  
When looking at the takeover offer, voestalpine justified the acquisition by stating that 
Böhler’s strategy was easy to align with its own strategy of quality leadership 
(voestalpine takeover offer, 2007). Despite not being mentioned separately, it can be 
assumed that the main goal of the acquisition was a reduction of costs, also by 
eliminating double marginalization.  
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A closer look at the post-acquisition performance shall shed more light on whether 
voestalpine shareholders benefitted from the acquisition strategy pursued by the 
management.  
The vertical integration of Böhler Uddeholm occurred before the financial crisis, which 
hit during the summer of 2007. When the acquisition took place, market conditions in 
the steel sector were favorable (see 4.2. 2007: the world steel production reaches the 
highest output ever measured) and also, Western Europe had the highest-value 
deals in the world (see 3.8). From this point of view, the acquirer was willing to take 
an additional debt burden. Nonetheless, the financial crisis soon gained momentum 
and hit other industries, amongst others, the steel industry. From September 2008 
onwards, the markets faced decreasing demand and credit restraints. In spite of 
isolating the performance of the companies from the index, it is hard to say whether a 
failed acquisition, a general downward trend in the economy, or a combination of 
both led to decreasing returns.  
Date Abnormal V Abnormal B 
02.01.2007 -3,40% -2,79% 
01.06.2007 17,28% 20,06% 
03.12.2007 12,86% 25,94% 
02.01.2008 14,69% 21,78% 
02.06.2008 24,32% 29,85% 
01.12.2008 -13,34%   
02.01.2009 -7,07%   
02.06.2009 5,55%   
01.12.2009 3,51%   
04.01.2010 9,03%   
01.06.2010 -0,50%   
 
Table 2. Abnormal returns in the long run, relative to the ATX 
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Illustration 14. Abnormal returns relative to the ATX, voestalpine and Böhler 
Uddeholm 2007-2010. 
One main factor, which has to be criticized when looking at the findings, is the short 
window during which the alphas and betas for the market had been approximated. 
The time span was solely 49 trading days and might therefore not be optimal.  
Moreover, a clear abstraction of confounding events has not been considered, mainly 
due to reasons of complexity.  
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6.2.4  Summary  
To sum up, the findings are as expected and mainly consistent with theoretical 
frameworks.  
Theory introduced in Chapter 2, namely the importance of capitals structure 
decisions, could also be found in the practical examination of voestalpine. The 
company was very well aware that these decisions can transport vital information to 
the market. By issuing debt, agents shall be kept from investing free cash flows in 
size- rather than value maximizing strategies.  
Furthermore, it appears that market conditions in the course of the takeover were 
favorable. Global M&A activity was elevated, and the steel producing industry was 
seeing increasing returns and a high demand for its products. If management would 
still have issued equity in these premises, the market would soon have anticipated 
that stock is overvalued, selling shares and thereby reducing value.  
Thus, both dynamic and also static principles of capital structure could be identified. I 
believe that in practice many factors play a vital role when deciding on the issuance 
of either equity or debt.  
Monitoring and the importance of minority- and large shareholders was also a central 
aspect in the takeover process. On the one hand, it was crucial to make a fair offer to 
minority shareholders, who would consequently sell their shares and abstract from 
free riding.  
On the other hand, large shareholders represented by the Fries group, were not only 
a part in monitoring management, but also lead to a fast acquisition process, since 
the voestalpine gained more than a foothold (almost 21%) at once.  
Subsequently, theory introduced in Chapter 3 gave a hint of why two companies 
decide to merge. In the underlying acquisition, both strategic drivers, and also 
synergistic gains due to the reduction of double marginalization and consolidation of 
operating processes played a role.  
To my mind, the acquisition took place at the end of a merger wave, since liquidity 
within the markets and the readiness to participate in M&A activity was high.  
75 
 
Once more it became obvious that target shareholders benefit to a larger extent than 
acquiring firm shareholders, still leaving the most important question unanswered. 
Why do firms even decide to take over another company, if synergies do not bring 
expected reductions in cost?  
The performance on the announcement date indicated that leakages might have 
occurred, mainly because expected movements in value did not take place. The 
Austrian market is small and therefore moves of the various players are easier to 
anticipate and to predict. Still, findings are not consistent with literature, which is 
mainly based on the assumption of efficient capital markets and thus does not allow 
for leakages as such. 
The post-acquisition success was hard to interpret, because the overall market did 
not perform well, therefore the performance might have been dragged down, not 
owing to the acquisition itself, but due to largely low demand. 
Valuation and associated issues such as hubris and the winner’s curse could not be 
identified in the underlying acquisition. This might be due to the fact that voestalpine 
was the only bidder, and also because Böhler Uddeholm did not resist the bid. 
Generally it can be said, that an overpayment of the target appears unlikely. This 
should result in a better performance. 
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APPENDIX 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Diese Diplomarbeit behandelt nicht nur die Theorie, die sich mit 
Unternehmenskäufen und –zusammenschlüssen auseinandersetzt, sondern versucht 
eine Brücke in die Praxis zu schlagen.  
Am Beispiel der Akquisition der Böhler Uddeholm durch den ebenfalls 
österreichischen Stahlkonzern voestalpine AG soll untersucht werden, ob und 
inwiefern die Transaktion als erfolgreich einzustufen ist.  
Um diese Frage beantworten zu können, wurde eine Event Study durchgeführt. Sie 
zeigte wie sich der Wert während des announcements und auch in der post-
acquisition entwickelt hat. Die Ergebnisse lassen leakages vermuten, da es zum 
Zeitpunkt des events zu vergleichbar geringen Auswirkungen auf den Kurs der 
jeweiligen Unternehmen kam. Außerdem hatte die weltweite Krise signifikante 
Auswirkungen auf die post-acuqisition performance.  
 
 
ABSTRACT  
The underlying thesis deals with the topic of mergers and acquisitions. The main idea 
was to examine whether the acquisition of Böhler Uddeholm by the voestalpine AG 
can be considered to be successful. The results show that leakages occurred during 
the course of the transaction. Furthermore the post-acquisition performance was 
greatly influenced by slow economic growth owing to the world economic crisis. 
Key words: M&A, mergers and acquisitions, voestalpine, Böhler Uddeholm, event 
study, leakage, economic success, announcement, post-acquisition performance. 
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